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Nuisance In A Nutshell
Howard L. Oleck*
UISANCE" IS A WORD, and a legal phenomenon, of vague
"Nand conflicting nature. It refers to a liability rather
than to an act. This article essays to summarize the modem law
of nuisance, briefly, and without detailed attempts to indicate the
latest points of evolution of the law on the subject.
In general terms, nuisance may be said to be all of the fol-
lowing: A class of wrongs or harms arising from unlawful or un-
reasonable use of one's property to the injury of others, or from
unlawful or unreasonable conduct or omission, to the injury of
others, producing such harm to the persons, rights or property
of those others as to raise a presumption of damage even where
no specific value of damage can be shown.1 It is anything that
endangers life, health, or freedom-from-interference, offends
the senses or the morals, or obstructs reasonable and comfortable
use of property.
2
It is generally agreed that the term has such a broad and
varied meaning that it cannot be exactly defined.3 It is used as
a "catch-all" term to cover many tortious acts or omissions for
which no particular names exist.4 Even the Restatement of the
Law of Torts leaves the field quite wide open in classifying and
describing "nuisances" as invasions of land interests.5 This is
one of the reasons for the growth, in recent years, of the custom
of treating many specific tortious acts, which are "nuisance," as
separate, generically-named matters (viz. "blasting," "riparian
rights," "lateral support," "smoke," "fumes," etc., etc.). It prob-
ably also partly helps to explain.the rapid development of "negli-
* A.B., Iowa; LL.B., New York Law School; Professor of Law, Cleveland-
Marshall Law School; Member of the New York Bar.
1 See, City of Phoenix v. Johnson, 51 Ariz. 115, 75 P. 2d 30 (1938). And see,
Waschak v. Moffat, 109 A. 2d 310 (Penna. 1955); Noted, 8 Vand. L. R. 921
(1955), on intentional interference. But see below, n. 12.
2 Black's Law Dict., 1214 (4th ed., 1951), cf., Hall v. Putney, 291 Ill. App.
508, 10 N. E. 2d 204, 207 (1937). Statutory definitions: Calif. Civ. Code, Secs.
3479, 3880; Burns Ind. Stats. Sec. 2-505; Page's Ohio Rev. Code, Sec. 3767.
3 Garrett, Law of Nuisances, 4 (3rd ed., 1908), Winfield, Torts, 442 (5th ed.,
1950); Prosser, Torts, Sec. 70 (2d ed., 1955); Seavey, Nuisance, 65 Harv.
L. R. 984 (1952); Hepburn, Cases on Torts, Chap. 5 (3rd ed., 1954).
4 See, Smith, Torts Without Particular Names, 69 U. Penna. L. R. 91 (1921).
5 Restatement, Torts, Secs. 822-840; and see, for discussion of the Restate-
ment and English views, Paton, Liability For Nuisance, 37 Ill. L. R. 1 (1942).
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gence" in recent years. Many things commonly classed in the
area of "negligence" today would have been included in "nui-
sance" in the past. And the two terms and areas of law blend
imperceptibly into each other, even more than is true of other
types of torts, most (but not all) of which also are largely ex-
plainable in terms of negligence. 6
Nuisance Distinguished from Other Torts
The principal differential between nuisance and negligence
is that of "continuity" of the improper invasion of interests of
others. Continuity of such invasion is the essence of nuisance.
This is a broader concept than the English rule of strict liability
as laid down in Rylands v. Fletcher.7 Accumulated waters on
one's own land, it was held in that case, if they burst upon the
land of another, constitute a trespass to land, but when they
continually seep into the land of another they constitute a nui-
sance.
8
The same conduct may be negligence and also nuisance. 9
But negligence is a violation of a relative duty, while nuisance
is a violation of an absolute duty.10 Nuisance-conduct is wrongful
in itself, negligence is wrongful only in failure to perform a duty
owed to the injured party, though the act itself is not wrongful."
If damage is an inevitable consequence or incident of what the
defendant does or omits, his conduct is nuisance rather than
negligence; but there must be some injury sustained, ordinarily,
in order to have a right of private action for nuisance.12
The fact that nuisance originally (historically) applied to
interference with the free use of land,13 and then became a
6 Cardozo, in McFarlane v. Niagara Falls, 247 N. Y. 340, 160 N. E. 391, 57
A. L. R. 1 (1928); and see, Winfield, Torts, 442 (5th ed., 1950); Harper, Torts,
371-374 (1933); Belli, Modern Trials, Sec. 70 (1954); Prosser, Nuisance With-
out Fault, 20 Tex. L. R. 399 (1942).
7 Rylands v. Fletcher (1868) L. R. 3 H. L. 330 (Engl.). See, Garner, Tres-
pass, Nuisance and Negligence, 106 L. J. 35 (1956); Newark, Trespass or
Nuisance or Negligence, 17 Modern L. R. 579 (1954).
8 Bohlen, The Rule in Rylands v. Fletcher, 59 U. Penna. L. R., 298 (1911).
9 Terrell v. Alabama Water Serv. Co., 245 Ala. 68, 15 S. 2d 727 (1943).
10 Flanagan v. Gregory & Poole, 67 S. E. 2d 865 (W. Va., 1951).
11 Blessington v. McCrory Stores Corp., 198 Misc. (N. Y.) 291, 95 N. Y. S.
2d 414 (1950).
12 Inevitable damage: Bohan v. Port Jervis Gaslight Co., 122 N. Y. 18, 25
N. E. 246, 9 L. R. A. 711 (1890). Actual damage: Ottumwa v. Nicholson, 161
Iowa 473, 143 N. W. 439 (1913).
13 Winfield, Nuisance as a Tort, 4 Cambr. L. J. 189 (1931). Liability now
exists (1913), L. R. A. 1916 E. 983.
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criminal writ for invasions of land by acts on one's own land,1 4
colors it to this day. Its nature as a "purpresture," or inter-
ference with property of the Crown,'15 also had a persistent ef-
fect. This probably had much to do with the rule (which still
exists) that "all nuisances may be abated by the mere act of an
(affected) individual" 16 (i.e., "self-help").
Some nuisances exist despite the exercise of all possible
care by the defendant. Breach of a duty is not a necessary
element in such cases.' 7
Trespass to land, as above pointed out, involves a usually
non-continuous, physical invasion.' 8 Nuisance includes this, plus
continuity in most cases, plus effects of intangibles and only-
technically-physical invading mechanisms, such as fumes, noise,
and the like.19
A nuisance also may be a crime or a misdemeanor, at the
same time that it is a civil tort, largely as a result of its old
criminal-remedy history, as well as because of its inherent
nature.
20
"Waste," also has many points of resemblance to nuisance;
but is a distinct subject in itself. The same might be said of
zoning laws or other rules of pure-real-property-law.
Classification of Nuisances
Nuisance per se means conduct, property, or an occupation
or calling, which is of itself, at any time and in any circumstances
or location, a nuisance.21 It is something harmful to life, prop-
erty, morals, or peace of mind, especially as to public rights or
property, as distinguished from things named as nuisances by
statutes, or things which are nuisances only under particular
14 Winfield, Torts, 442 (5th ed., 1950).
15 Attorney-General v. Richards, 2 Anstruther 603 (Engl.) Ct. Exch. (1795);
Garrett, Law of Nuisances, 1 (3rd ed., 1908).
16 Attorney-General v. Richards, ibid., n. 15; 3 Bl. Comm. 5, 168.
17 Helms v. Eastern Kansas Oil Co., 102 Kans. 164, 169 P. 208, L. R. A. 1918
C, 227 (1917).
Is See, Williams v. Pomeroy Coal Co., 37 Ohio St. 583 (1882).
19 Harper, Torts, 374 (1933).
20 Commonwealth v. Smith, 266 Penna., 511, 109 A. 786, 9 A. L. R. 922
(1920); People ex rel. Bennett v. Laman, 250 A. D. 660, 295 N. Y. S. 728,
aff'd., 277 N. Y. 368, 14 N. E. 2d 439 (1938).
21 Keys v. City of Versailles, 224 Mo. App. 178, 22 S. W. 2d 182 (1929);
American Cement Corp. v. Price, 164 Md. 234, 164 A. 545 (1933).
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circumstances or in particular places. 22 This (per se nuisance)
sometimes also is termed "absolute nuisance."
Nuisance in fact means conduct, property, or an occupation
or calling, which is not a nuisance per se, but which may be-
come harmful (nuisance) in particular locations, or in par-
ticular circumstances.
23
Continuing nuisance means one that continues unceasingly,
or so often-recurring as to have a substantially continuous harm-
ful effect.
24
Permanent nuisance means one that will inevitably do more
damage if allowed to continue,25 or one that is difficult or expen-
sive to abate.2
6
Common nuisance means the same as "public nuisance." 2 7
Public nuisance is one that affects an indefinite number of
people, or an entire area or community, though its effects on
each individual therein may vary.28 Being an offense against the
public, it is a crime. It is not actionable by an individual, but
only by the "state," ordinarily, unless and until it injures him
personally or directly. Then it becomes also a "private nuisance"
as to him.29 Thus, one injured by an obstruction or hole in a
public road is personally damaged in this sense.30 And thus it is
clear that the same conduct may be both a public and a private
nuisance. 31 This is treated more fully, below.
22 Simpson v. DuPont Powder Co., 143 Ga. 465, 85 S. E. 344, L. R. A. 1915 E,
430 (1915); Whitmore v. Paper Co., 91 Me. 297, 39 A. 1032, 40 L. R. A. 377(1898); Hundley v. Harrison, 123 Ala. 292, 26 S. 294 (1899).
23 Asphalt Products Co. v. Marable, 65 Ga. App. 877, 16 S. E. 2d 771 (1941).
24 Kafka v. Bozio, 191 Calif. 746, 218 P. 753, 29 A. L. R. 833 (1923).
25 N6rfolk & W. R. Co. v. Allen, 118 Va. 428, 87 S. E. 558, 560 (1916).
26 Cumberland Torpedo Co. v. Gaines, 201 Ky. 88, 255 S. W. 1046 (1923).
27 State v. Rodgers, 91 N. J. L. 212, 102 A. 433 (1917).
28 Lansing v. Smith, 4 Wend. (N. Y.) 30, 21 Am. Dec. 89 (1829); Chese-
brough v. Comm'rs., 37 Ohio St. 508 (1882); Salmond, Torts, 233 (8th ed.,
1934). For modern tests of what is a "public" nuisance, see, Ballenger v.
Grand Saline, 276 S. W. 2d 874 (Tex., 1955); Noted 7 Baylor L. R. 468 (1955).
Double parking, as nuisance and false imprisonment, Harnik v. Levine,
106 N. Y. S. 2d 460 (1951), Noted, 13 U. Pitt. L. R. 771 (1952); 4 Ala. L. R.
309 (1952); criticized, 51 Col. L. R. 1067 (1951).
29 Davis v. Spragg, 72 W. Va. 672, 79 S. E. 652, 48 L. R. A. (N. S.) 173
(1913); Kneece v. City of Columbia, 128 So. Car. 375, 123 S. E. 100 (1924);
Re Debs, 158 U. S. 564, 15 S. Ct. 900, 39 L. ed. 1092 (1895).
30 Downs v. Silva, 57 R. I. 343, 190 A. 42 (1937); Smith, Private Action for
Obstruction to Public Right of Passage, 15 Columbia L. R. 1 (1915).
31 Harris v. Poulton, 99 W. Va. 20, 127 S. E. 647, 650, 40 A. L. R. 334 (1925);
Baltzeger v. Carolina M. R. Co., 54 So. Car. 242, 32 S. E. 358 (1899).
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Private nuisance was originally a continuing injury to prop-
erty rights of another.3 2 Its much broader sense, as a "sever-
able" part of a public nuisance, is indicated in the foregoing
paragraph. Its essence is "private damage."
Mixed nuisance is a term sometimes applied to a nuisance
which is both public and private in its effects, as above sketched.
33
Pleading Nuisance and Negligence, Alternatively
As this is not an article on pleading, no treatment of the
alternative pleading of nuisance and negligence (or other causes
of action, or theories of suit) can be given here. That subject is
treated in works on negligence forms of pleading.34 It should be
noted, however, that the above-described indistinctness of sepa-
ration of nuisance from negligence, as theories of law, obviously
is responsible for the common practice of lawyers of pleading
both causes of action, as a matter of routine, in one complaint.
3 5
Public, and Private Nuisance
"Public nuisance" and "private nuisance" are defined above.
Without attempting to list more than a few of the innumer-
able possible types of public nuisances, the following are listed
as typical:
Obstructing a road.3
Smoke or fumes, or pollution of waters.
37
Bawdy house.38
32 Whittemore v. Baxter Laundry Co., 181 Mich. 564, 148 N. W. 437, 52
L. R. A. (N. S.) 930 (1914). See, Notes, Recent Change in Pennsylvania's
Concept of Private Nuisance, 16 U. Pitt. L. R. 384 (1955); Private Nuisance
in Louisiana Law, 15 La. L. R. 441 (1955).
33 Kelley v. N. Y., 6 Misc. (N. Y.) 516, 27 N. Y. S. 164 (1894).
34 Oleck, Negligence Forms of Pleading, 19, 171, 295, 1093, et passim (1956
revision).
35 Ibid., n. 34, as to alternative pleading, esp. pp. 50, 62, 63; and see, Belli,
Modern Trials, 492 (1954). For a recent discussion of what must be alleged,
see, Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v. Smith, 290 S. W. 2d 696 (Tex. Civ. App.,
1956).
36 Pilgrim Plywood Corp. v. Melendy, 110 Vt. 12, 1 A. 2d 700 (1938).
37 As to smoke or fumes, or dust, etc.: Page's Ohio Rev. Code, Sec. 3767.13
et seq.; State v. United Cork Co., 116 N. J. Eq. 4, 172 A. 347 (1934); 3
A. L. R. 312; 11 A. L. R. 1401; 58 A. L. R. 1225. As to pollution: Page's Ohio
Rev. Code, Sec. 3767.13, et seq.; Markwand v. Guthrie, 18 Okla. 32, 90 P. 26,
9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1150 (1907); Southland Co. v. McDonald, 82 S. 2d 448
(Miss., 1955), Noted, 27 Miss. L. J. 150 (1956); Clark v. City of Springfield,
241 S. W. 2d 100 (Mo., 1953).
38 People ex rel. Lemon v. Elmore, 256 N. Y. 489, 177 N. E. 14 (1931), 75
A. L. R. 1292; Dyer v. Clark, 268 Ill. 156, 108 N. E. 994 (1915); Page's Ohio
Rev. Code, Sec. 3767.01.
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Blasting, and noise.3 9
Gambling.40
Billiard hall.41
Golf course.
42
Lateral support, blasting, and many other such matters, are
problems in real property law, fundamentally.
In many cases, of course, nuisances are both private and
public (i.e.: "mixed" nuisances). The question is almost in-
evitably one of fact, in most cases. And the nuisance may be
that even in the absence of fault.43 It has been well-said that "a
nuisance may be merely a right thing in the wrong place, like a
pig in the parlor instead of the barnyard." 44
Statutes (such as zoning laws) now usually provide, di-
rectly or indirectly, for public nuisances. Usually they include
all the common law types and, by not defining a nuisance too
clearly, apply to almost any possible type of wrong or harm.45
For a private nuisance to arise out of a public nuisance,
special damage must be shown. Otherwise a private person has
no personal right of action for a public wrong, but must leave
such action to the public authorities. 46
39 Noise: Note, Noise Nuisances, 7 Vand. L. R. 695 (1954); Town of Davis
v. Davis, 40 W. Va. 464, 21 S. E. 906 (1895). And, 33 A. L. R. 725 (amuse-
ments); 90 A. L. R. 1207 (factories); 82 A. L. R. 1109 (radio). Blasting: See,
Note, 5 Ala. L. R. 78 (1952); Jones v. Johnson Const. Co., 211 Minn. 123, 300
N. W. 447 (1941).
40 Regez v. Blumer, 236 Wis. 129, 294 N. W. 491 (1940) (lottery); Engel v.
State, 53 Ariz. 458, 90 P. 2d 988 (1939). Or a "Thieves' nest." Page's Ohio
Rev. Code, Sec. 3767.12.
41 20 A. L. R. 1496; 53 A. L. R. 162.
42 23 A. L. R. 447; Bernstein, "Slice" and It May "Hook" You, 15 Phila.
Shingle 208 (1952).
43 See, Prosser, Nuisance Without Fault, 20 Tex. L. R. 339 (1942); Noel,
Nuisances from Land in its Natural Condition, 56 Harv. L. R. 772 (1943);
Smith, Reasonable use of One's Own Property as a Justification for Damage
to a Neighbor, 17 Columbia L. R. 383 (1917).
44 Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365, 47 S. Ct. 114, 54 A. L. R. 1016
(1926).
45 Engel v. State, 53 Ariz. 458, 90 P. 2d 988 (1939). For discussion of judicial
zoning by nuisance decisions, see, Beuscher & Morrison, Note, in 1955 Wis.
L. R. 440; and Zoning Laws, Note, 54 Mich. L. R. 266 (1955). For a typical
statute definition of nuisance see, Calif. Civ. Code, Sec. 3479; or Burns Ind.
Stats., Sec. 2-505.
46 Bouquet v. Hackensack Water Co., 90 N. J. L. 203, 101 A. 379, L. R. A.
1917 F, 206 (1917); Cope v. District Fair Assn., 99 Ill. 489 (1881); Common-
wealth v. Smith, 266 Penna. 511, 109 A. 786, 9 A. L. R. 922 (1920). As to
what is "special damage" see, Oleck, Damages To Persons & Property, 55, 80
(1956 revision).
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Often the statutes also expressly (sometimes, impliedly)
give a personal right of action to individuals affected.47 But if
the personal (especially, pecuniary) rights of one of the affected
group are injured, he has a "mixed" right of both public and
private nuisance.4 s He may have personal rights in negligence,
however, even where he cannot show "special" damage in a public
nuisance. 49
Many courts still prefer to award special damages only if a
"property right" of some kind can be shown to have been injured,
even in private nuisance cases. This tendency stems from the
historical development of nuisance as an injury to property.
Thus, even the howling of a dog is seized on as an invasion of
the private "property" right to peace and quiet, and of "quiet en-
joyment." 50
The "reasonableness of use" of the offender's use of his own
property is a factor that tends to cancel out the right of the
injured party to complain. This usually is a question of fact,
too.5 1 Thus, some smoke is bound to come from almost any
chimney, or some sounds and noises from any building or home.
52
The standards of the community and of ordinary persons must
govern. Public value of the activity always is important, and
often will cause a court to refuse injunctive relief that otherwise
might be granted.53 Thus, often a factory employing many per-
47 Littleton v. Fritz, 65 Iowa 488, 22 N. W. 641, 54 Am. Rep. 19 (1885);
Page's Ohio Rev. Code, Sec. 3767.03.
48 Herold v. Glendale Lodge No. 1289, B. P. 0. E., 46 Calif. App. 325, 189 P.
329 (1920); Cope v. District Fair Assn., 99 111. 489 (1881). Thus, a crowd
regularly outside a restaurant, on the sidewalk. Shamhart v. Morrison
Cafeteria Co., 159 Fla. 629, 32 S. 2d 727, 2 A. L. R. 2d 429 (1947); Noted, 26
Chi-Kent L. R. 355 (1947).
49 Kneece v. City of Columbia, 128 So. Car. 375, 123 S. E. 100 (1924).
50 Restatement, Torts, Sec. 822, Comment c; Hubbard v. Preston, 90 Mich.
221, 51 N. W. 209, 15 L. R. A. 249 (1892).
51 Restatement, Torts, Secs. 826-831; McCarty v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co.,
189 N. Y. 40, 81 N. E. 549, 13 L. R. A. (N. S.) 465 (1907). Sic utere tuo ut
alienum non laedas (use what is yours so that you do not injure another's).
Campbell v. Seaman, 63 N. Y. 577, 20 Am. Rep. 567 (1876).
Question for jury: Ohio Oil Co. v. Westfall, 43 Ind. App. 661, 88 N. E.
354 (1909). But may be so clear as to be a matter of law: Snow v. Parsons,
28 Vt. 459, 67 Am. Dec. 723 (1856).
52 Holman v. Athens E. Laundry Co., 149 Ga. 645, 100 S. E. 207, 6 A. L. R.
1564 (1919); Smith, Reasonable Use as a Justification for Damage to a
Neighbor, 17 Columbia L. R. 383 (1917).
53 State v. Rumpke, 130 N. E. 2d 243 (Ohio App., 1955); 65 C. J. S., Negli-
gence, Sec. 176; Brede v. Minnesota Crushed Stone Co., 143 Minn., 374, 173
N. W. 805, 6 A. L. R. 1092 (1919); Payne v. Johnson, 20 Wash. 2d 24, 145 P.
2d 552 (1944); Collins v. Wayne Iron Works, 227 Penna. 326, 76 A. 24 (1910).
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sons, or a public utility, will be favored in this way. Usually such
decisions are based on the equitable principle of "balancing of
hardships."
Reasoning of a Nuisance Decision
Dawson v. Laufersweiler54 is an excellent recent illustration
of the reasoning of a court in handling the fundamentally factual
problem of a nuisance. In that case, the court's decision said, in
part:
"The question for decision is whether construction of a
funeral home across the street from plaintiffs' residence
should be enjoined as a threatened nuisance ...
The intersection 3d Avenue South and 12th Street where
plaintiffs live and defendant wants to build the funeral home
is surrounded at varying distances by residences. Many of
the older and better homes in the city are near by. However,
the main business district to the north and west has expanded
to within a block from this intersection....
The authorities agree that undertaking is a lawful and
necessary business and a funeral home is not a nuisance
per se. However, it may become a nuisance from the man-
ner in which it is conducted and, according to many au-
thorities, because of its location. There is no fixed rule gov-
erning all cases of this kind-each must be determined upon
its own facts. See Beisel v. Crosby, 104 Neb. 643, 178 N. W.
272, 273; Hatcher v. Hitchcock, supra, 129 Kan. 88, 281 P.
869, 872; Cunningham v. Miller, 178 Wis. 22, 189 N. W. 531,
534, 23 A. L. R. 739, 742; O'Malley v. Macken, 182 Minn. 294,
234 N. W. 323, 324; Jack v. Torrant, 136 Conn. 414, 71 A. 2d
705, 709; Anno. 87 A. L. R. 1061.
When it is sought to establish a funeral home in a purely
residential district it is held by many decisions to be a
nuisance. In Bevington v. Otte, 223 Iowa 509, 273 N. W. 98,
we held a funeral home in a purely residential district was a
nuisance. In the cited case no business was located within
four or five blocks of the place. Two plaintiffs lived much
nearer defendants' establishment than plaintiffs do here. The
driveway where bodies were loaded and unloaded was only
about 19 feet from the Bevington residence. The Otte funeral
home was not soundproof. No permit had been issued for it.
As stated, issuance of a permit pursuant to ordinance is a
proper matter to consider on the question of nuisance al-
54 Dawson v. Laufersweiler, 241 Iowa 850, 43 N. W. 2d 726 (1950). For a
quite recent case on the same point see, Jones v. Trawick, 75 S. 2d 785 (Fla.,
1955); Noted, 1 Wayne L. R. 225 (1955). Also, Frederick v. Brown Funeral
Homes, Inc., 62 S. 2d 100 (La., 1953), Noted, 10 W. & L. L. R. 235 (1953).
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though it is not conclusive. We think Bevington v. Otte is
not controlling here.
In any event, we are not now prepared to hold, as plain-
tiffs apparently would have us, that every funeral home, even
when properly maintained and operated is necessarily a
nuisance merely because it is located in a residential district.
Of course it may become a nuisance under the facts of a
particular case....
Plaintiffs' main objection to defendant's establishment is
that it would have such a depressing effect upon the mem-
bers of the family as to impair the comfort and enjoyment of
their home and depreciate its value. It is true many cases
have upheld similar objections where it is proposed to put
a funeral home in a purely residential district. In effect they
hold a funeral home in a strictly residential district is a
nuisance per se because of the inherent nature of the busi-
ness, although conducted in an approved manner, without
unpleasant odors or disease germs. See Laughlin, Wood &
Co. v. Cooney, 220 Ala. 556, 126 So. 864; Leland v. Turner,
117 Kan. 294, 230 P. 1061; Kundinger v. Bagnasco, 298 Mich.
15, 298 N. W. 386, and citations; Streett v. Marshall, 316 Mo.
698, 291 S. W. 494; Jordan v. Mesmith, 132 Okl. 226, 269 P.
1096. We are not in agreement with this view.
However, we think these and similar decisions are not
applicable here....
A number of courts have refused to enjoin establishment
of a funeral home in a location close to the business district
or in a state of transition from residences to commercial uses.
White v. Luquire Funeral Home, 221 Ala. 440, 129 So. 84;
Fentress v. Sicard, 181 Ark. 173, 25 S. W. 2d 18; Moss v.
Burke & Trotti, 198 La. 76, 3 So. 2d 281; Dutt v. Fales, 250
Mich. 579, 230 N. W. 948; O'Malley v. Macken, supra, 182
Minn. 294, 234 N. W. 323; Meldahl v. Holberg, 55 N. D. 523,
214 N. W. 802; Linsler v. Booth Undertaking Co., 120 Wash.
177, 206 P. 976. See also Kirk v. Habis, 215 Iowa 769, 246
N. W. 759, 87 A. L. R. 1055, where we refused to enjoin a
funeral home in a district zoned for commercial purposes
although residences were apparently close by.
The statutory definition of nuisance in Minnesota and
in North Dakota is almost identical with our (Iowa) section
657.1, Codes, 1946, 1950, I. C. A.
The mere fact the location of the funeral home would de-
preciate the value of plaintiff's property for residence pur-
poses does not entitle them to relief. O'Malley v. Macken,
supra, 182 Minn. 294, 234 N. W. 323; 39 Am. Jur., Nuisances,
section 28, 46 C. J., Nuisances, section 56. Location near
them of any one of numerous lawful businesses might de-
preciate the value of their property. Any increase in auto-
9Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1956
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mobile traffic which would result from operation of the new
home is clearly insufficient basis for injunctive relief....
Injunctions are granted sparingly, with caution and only
in clear cases. A threatened nuisance will be enjoined only
where it clearly appears a nuisance will necessarily result
from the thing it is sought to enjoin. Amdor v. Cooney,
Iowa, 43 N. W. 2d 136, 137, 141, and citations. See also Dutt
v. Fales, supra, 250 Mich. 579, 230 N. W. 948, 949; White v.
Old York Road Country Club, supra, 322 Pa. 147, 185 A.
316, 318. After careful consideration we feel this is not such
a case.
Reversed.
[The decision was 5 to 2, with one other judge ab-
staining.]
(One dissenting justice said:)
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. How-
ever, I desire to express my disapproval of it.
The case of Bevington v. Otte, 223 Iowa 509, 273 N. W.
98, 102, should be, and in'my opinion is, controlling in the
case here reviewed. But the majority opinion states it is
not. I believe it should not be distinguished." 5
Remedies for Nuisance
The private remedies for injury or damage resulting from
nuisance are:
1. Self-help; abating the nuisance personally, by the use
of reasonable force only.56 But no breach of the peace must be
the result.57 And usually notice, and opportunity to cure the
nuisance, must be given.58
2. Action for damages, with jury trial.5 9 This is the basic
remedy.
55 Dawson v. Laufersweiler, 241 Iowa 850, 43 N. W. 2d 726 (1950). For a
quite recent case on the same point see, Jones v. Trawick, 75 S. 2d 785 (Fla.,
1955); Noted, 1 Wayne L. R. 225 (1955). Also, Frederick v. Brown Funeral
Homes, Inc., 62 S. 2d 100 (La., 1953), Noted, 10 W. & L. L. R. 235 (1953).
56 Hubbard v. Preston, 90 Mich. 221, 51 N. W. 209, 15 L. R. A. 249 (1892)
(dog); Meeker v. Van Rensselaer, 15 Wend. (N. Y.) 397 (1836) (disease);
Humphrey Oil Co. v. Liles, 262, 1058 (Tex. Civ. App.), aff'd., 277 S. W. 100
(Tex. Com. App., 1925).
57 People v. Severance, 125 Mich. 556, 84 N. W. 1089 (1901).
58 State v. Brown, 191 No. Car. 419, 132 S. E. 5 (1926).
59 Cumberland Torpedo Co. v. Gaines, 201 Ky. 88, 255 S. W. 1046 (1923).
As to jury trial (constitutional right), see, People ex rel. Lemon v. Elmore,
256 N. Y. 489, 177 N. E. 14 (1931); 75 A. L. R. 1292. Measure of damages
ordinarily is the same as in a negligence action. Kentucky, W. Va. Gas Co.
v. Lafferty, 174 F. 2d 848 (C. C. A. 6, 1949), 10 A. L. R. 2d 661; and see
generally, Oleck, Damages To Persons & Property (1956 revision).
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3. Equity or statutory injunction (mandatory or prohibitory
injunction or order).60 As to this, see the preceding section for
a practical modern illustration. Here too, "special injury" must
be shown, in cases of public nuisance, in order for an individual
to obtain an injunction.6 1 This is also because Equity will not
enjoin a crime, because of constitutional rights of the accused
person. 2
Calendar priority usually is granted by modern statutes, such
as Ohio Rev. Code, Sec. 3767.05. As in most Equity matters, the
action must be at law, for damages, unless "irreparable" injuries
make the remedy of damages at law inadequate.
Of course statutes now usually also provide for penalties
such as fines or imprisonment in convictions for public nuisance.
Ohio's Revised Code (Sec. 3767.99) is typical, setting fines rang-
ing from $25 to $1000, and imprisonment ranging from 30 days
to six months for various specified offenses.
It is interesting to note that Ohio Rev. Code (Sec. 3767.23)
specifically provides that a corporation may be prosecuted and
punished criminally for nuisance.
Defenses
Reasonableness of use of one's own property always is a de-
fense to a charge of nuisance; and so is the fact that the conduct
or thing complained of would not affect the average, normal
person.6 3
"Privilege," or "authorization" (e.g.: by licensing, com-
pliance with zoning laws, etc.) also may be a defense. 64 But this
still requires reasonable care, especially to avoid a charge of neg-
60 Edmunds v. Duff, 280 Penna. 355, 124 A. 489, 33 A. L. R. 719 (1924);
Amsterdam Knitting Co. v. Dean, 162 N. Y. 278, 56 N. E. 757 (1900); Herold
v. Glendale Lodge No. 1289, B. P. 0. E., 46 Calif. App. 325, 189 P. 329
(1920); injunction and damages, Spaulding v. Cameron, 239 P. 2d 625 (Calif.,
1953), Noted, 26 So. Calif. L. R. 338 (1953). Statutory: Page's Ohio Rev.
Code, Sec. 3767.04 details the procedure.
61 See, above, discussion of "public" and "private."
62 State v. Ehrlich, 65 W. Va. 700, 64 S. E. 935, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 691
(1909). Enforcement is based on equity or statutory contempt rules. See,
Page's Ohio Rev. Code, Sec. 3767.24.
63 See, above, last paragraph of discussion of "public" and "private," as to
reasonableness. As to effect on "average person," see, Restatement, Torts,
Sec. 822, Comment g.
64 Sadler v. City of N. Y., 40 Misc. (N. Y.) 78, 81 N. Y. S. 308 (1903); Han-
num v. Oak Lane Shopping Center, 119 A. 2d 213 (Penna., 1956) (parking
lot, conformity to zoning laws).
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ligence.65 That is, a valid defense against possible injunction
may be insufficient defense to prevent an award of damages for
negligence. Nor is the licensor-city liable, unless it had notice,
or the licensed activity was inherently dangerous.66
Similar nuisances by others are no defense.67
Contributory negligence usually is not a defense in a purely-
nuisance case.68 But sometimes it is, where negligence is the
basis of the case, as where one deliberately permits his cattle to
drink polluted water.69 Or, when the contributory negligence
actually constitutes assumption of risk or "avoidable conse-
quences," as in willfully running into a visible obstruction in a
road.70
But one who acquires property as to which a known nuisance
already exists is not estopped thereby from charging nuisance, 71
unless prescriptive rights have arisen, or he bought it only for
the purpose of bringing suit.72
Riparian rights may allow an upper owner of land along a
stream to use a reasonable amount of water, and to make other
reasonable use of it. 73 And actual damage must be shown.7 4
The English doctrine of "ancient lights" (eg.: light and air)
is not recognized in the United States, except where malicious
interference (e.g., tall spite fence) is shown.7 5 Zoning statutes
now usually cover this problem.
65 Hakila v. Old Colony Broken Stone & C. Co., 264 Mass. 447, 162 N. E.
895 (1928).
66 Wheeler v. Plymouth, 116 Ind. 158, 18 N. E. 532 (1888); and see, East
Coast Freight Lines v. Consolidated G., E. L. & P. Co., 187 Md., 385, 50 A.
2d 246 (1946).
67 Birch v. Boston & M. R. R., 259 Mass. 528, 156 N. E. 859 (1927); Jordan
v. United Verde Copper Co., 9 F. 2d 144 (D. C. Ariz., 1925).
68 McFarlane v. City of Niagara Falls, 247 N. Y. 340, 160 N. E. 391, 57
A. L. R. 1, 7 (1928); Sheeler v. Waterbury, 138 Conn. 111, 82 A. 2d 359(1951). Contra: Brown v. Alter, 251 Mass. 223, 146 N. E. 691, 38 A. L. R.
1036 (1925).
69 Indiana Pipe Line Co. v. Christensen, 195 Ind. 106, 143 N. E. 596 (1924);
Denny v. Garavaglia, 333 Mich. 317, 52 N. W. 2d 521 (1952); Seavey,
Nuisances: Contributory Negligence and Other Mysteries, 65 Harv. L. R.
984 (1952).
70 McFarlane case, n. 68, above; Seavey article, supra, n. 69.
71 Campbell v. Seaman, 63 N. Y. 568, 20 Am. Rep. 567 (1876).
72 Edwards v. Allouez Mining Co., 38 Mich. 46, 31 Am. Rep. 301 (1878).
73 Baker, Fleming & Hubert v. Brown, 55 Tex. 377 (1881); Stratton v. Mt.
Hermon Boys' School, 216 Mass. 83, 103 N. E. 87, 49 L. R. A. (N. S.) 57
(1913).
74 Hazen v. Perkins, 92 Vt. 414, 105 A. 249, 23 A. L. R. 748 (1918).
75 Flaherty v. Moran, 81 Mich. 52, 45 N. W. 381, 8 L. R. A. 183 (1890).
"Ancient Lights" doctrine: see, Martin v. Price, L. R. (1894), 1 Chancery
276.
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Particular defenses for particular types of claims of nui-
sance in such specific matters as blasting, smoke, chemicals, ex-
plosives, etc., would require too much space to permit discussion
here.
Attractive Nuisance Doctrine
The doctrine of "attractive nuisance," which is followed by
most states, and rejected by some, is actually not a matter of
nuisance law, fundamentally. Today it is treated rather as a
matter of negligence and "due care." 76
Philosophy of the Law of Nuisance
Sound pragmatic development of the law of nuisance is evi-
dent in the foregoing summary. How profound that law is is
another matter. In any event, it reflects the elastic adaptability
of the common law. But it shows, too, the characteristic paucity
of "projective" thinking that is the great weakness of the com-
mon law. Only quite recently has any notable general tendency
towards judicial thinking-into-the-future become apparent in
Anglo-American jurisprudence.
No branch of our law more clearly shows the real nature of
our legal philosophy than does the law of nuisance and negli-
gence. Typically, it is an amalgam of case decisions based on
somewhat conservative social views, overlaying a piecemeal
growth of limited legislation, on a core of feudal concepts of
property rights.
Broadest of all the elements apparent here is the philosophic
principle which Kant termed the categorical imperative. That
philosophy says, in essence: "Act according to a maxim which
76 See, in this issue of C-M. L. R., Debevec article: "Is The Attractive Nui-
sance Doctrine Outmoded?" For recent literature and cases on attractive
nuisance see, Munkman, Accidents To Straying Children, 105 L. J. 675
(1955); Note, Liability to Infant Trespassers in New York, 7 Syracuse L. R.
137 (1955); Fridman, Dangerous Objects and the Trespassing Child, 23 Sol.
65 (London, 1956); Oleck, Negligence Forms of Pleading, 202 et passim (1956
revision); Kahn v. J. Burton Co., 126 N. E. 2d 836 (Ill., 1955) (building
material suppliers), Noted, 10 SW. L. J. 207 (1956); Mayer v. Temple Prop-
erties, 122 N. E. 2d 909 (N. Y., 1955), Noted, 21 Bklyn. L. R. 287 (1955); 34
Tex. L. R. 667 (1956); Louisville & N. R. R. Co. v. Spence's Admr., 282
S. W. 2d 826 (Ky. App., 1955); Hoff v. Natural Ref. Pdts. Co., 118 A. 2d
714 (N. J. App., 1956); Beaston v. J. Julian, Inc., 120 A. 2d 317 (Del., 1956)
rejecting the doctrine; Restatement, Torts, Sec. 339; Smith v. Evans, 284 P.
2d 1065 (Kans., 1955) accepting the doctrine; Commercial Union F. Ins. Co.
v. Blocker, 86 S. 2d 760 (La. App., 1956) accepting it; 65 C. J. S., Negligence,
Sec. 29, pp. 456-480. Ohio, Md., Mass., N. Y., Vt., and Va. reject the doctrine.
See Debevec article referred to above.
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can be adopted at the same time as a universal law." This is
more than the doctrine of stare decisis.
Of course the Kantian idea really is just a special form of
expression of the Golden Rule. But our law of nuisance and
negligence expresses that ethos primarily in terms of here and
now. Viz.: Sic utere tuo (now) ut alienum non laedas (now or
in the near future).
It was Justice Holmes who most clearly indicated the prag-
matic nature of our modern law of nuisance and negligence.
Austin's view had prevailed, before that-namely, that civil
liability in tort is basically a sanction (i.e., a penalty for dis-
obedience of a rule imposed by the sovereign). In place of this
Holmes set the chief rule of the common law-that experience
is the best determinant of what conduct the law can and should
demand of the "average reasonable man."
From both basic philosophies there were evolved the ideas
of duty and foreseeability, crystallized and expounded by Justice
Cardozo. Rylands v. Fletcher became Buick v. Macpherson.
Of course, changes in public policy have affected parties and
courts in this as in other areas of law. But in the past 50 years
one new final factor has become vitally important. It is yet to
be fully amalgamated. This is the factor of scientific advance.
As yet its full effects on the law clearly are only a fraction of
what they should be.
Here then lies the weakness of the present law. That law
well reflects Kantian orderliness, Holmesian pragmatism, and
Cardozon morality. But it fails, as yet, to reflect adequately the
sweeping advances of scientific knowledge. Therein, despite its
otherwise sound syllogisms, it must often err in particular cases.
Undoubtedly current interest in medico-legal and other
science-law advances will produce profound effects, in time.
As yet however, as the foregoing summary indicates, the lack of
a proper proportion of scientific advance is only beginning to
be cured.
Until that lack is fully cured, the legal syllogism of this
branch of law is unlikely to be completely sound.
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